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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Matthew Boyd Davis appeals from

the denial of his motion t0 suppress evidence after

entering a conditional guilty plea t0 possession 0f methamphetamine.

Statement

Of The

On

July

Facts

1,

And Course Of The Proceedings

2018,

around 2:45 a.m., Ofﬁcer Trevor Stokes was parked in a marked

at

(TL, p.8, L.14

patrol car near a gas station.

parking

lot

p.1

1,

L.13.1)

onto Vista Avenue Without coming t0 a

(TL, p.9, L.15

As he

— p.9,

—

p.10, L.13.)

He saw

full stop

a vehicle exit the gas station’s

and apparently Without braking.

Ofﬁcer Stokes began following the vehicle.

(Tr., p.10, Ls. 14—16.)

did so, he noticed that the taillights on the vehicle were not operating.

He

L.2.)

conﬁrmed

then turned off his

that the taillights

trafﬁc stop and identiﬁed

own headlights

were not functioning.

Matthew Davis

to reduce

L.17 —

any potential glare on the vehicle and

(Tr., p.1 1, Ls.3-10.)

as the driver.

(Tr., p.10,

(T12, p.1 1,

L.11

Ofﬁcer Stokes

— p.12,

initiated a

L.15.) After

two

other ofﬁcers arrived 0n scene, they observed What appeared to be a bulge in DaVis’ pocket, as

When

well as a container of alcohol in the console of the vehicle.

(R., pp.47-48, 54.2)

asked him t0 exit the vehicle so that they could

weapons, he exited the vehicle and

then ran.

References to

the hearing

‘Tr.’ are to the

on DaVis’ motion

ﬁle

titled

trafﬁc stop

arrest,

and discovered

was justiﬁed,

initiated. But, as

‘DaVis 47032 trs.pdf,’ which contains the transcript of

to suppress, held

0f plea hearing, held January 24, 2019.
Because the motion to suppress that
initial

for

(Id.)

2

was

him

Ofﬁcers arrested him, searched him incident t0 that

(Id.)

methamphetamine.

1

frisk

ofﬁcers

is

January

4,

2019, and the transcript 0f the change

the subject of this appeal focused only

0n whether the

the parties did not elicit testimony regarding events after the stop

reﬂected in the parties” brieﬁng 0n the motion t0 suppress, cited here, there

does not appear to be any dispute regarding those events.

The

state

charged Davis With possession 0f methamphetamine, resisting and obstructing

an ofﬁcer, possession 0f an open container of alcohol in a vehicle, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and driving Without privileges.

and memorandum

in support arguing that because a magistrate

trafﬁc Violations that

Davis ﬁled a motion t0 suppress

(R., pp.27-28.)

prompted Ofﬁcer Stokes

judge found him not guilty of the

to initiate the trafﬁc stop, that stop

was not

justiﬁed and any evidence recovered after the stop should be suppressed as fruit of an unlawﬁll

detention.

insufﬁcient evidence t0

committed was
time to

The prosecutor responded

(R., pp.39-51.)

show beyond a reasonable doubt

irrelevant to the question

initiate the stop.

ﬁnding

that a

in a separate matter

Violations

were

Whether Ofﬁcer Stokes had reasonable suspicion

at the

that the trafﬁc

(R., pp.53-57.)

The hearing on DaVis’ motion

to suppress

began with Davis’ attorney suggesting

intended to provide the court a copy 0f the recording or transcript of the
Violations.

trial

prosecutor obj ected t0 any consideration 0f the recording or transcript from the

L.14 — p.25, L.4.)

The court then held
and denied the motion

from the

that

of the trafﬁc Violations.

(TL, p.39, L.4

to believe

the parking lot and reasonable

functioning. (Id.)

trial

(Tr., p.30,

Ofﬁcer Stokes had reasonable suspicion

to suppress.

had reasonable suspicion

and declined

district court sustained that objection

transcript 0r audio recording

he

0n the trafﬁc

trial

of the trafﬁc

any testimony provided therein would be irrelevant hearsay.

The

that

After testimony from the only witness, Ofﬁcer Stokes, the

(TL, p.6, Ls.5-16.)

Violations, arguing that

of

— p.40, L20.)

It

(Tr., p.23,

to consider

L.5

— p.31,

any

L.19.)

t0 initiate the trafﬁc stop

concluded that Ofﬁcer Stokes

both that Davis failed t0 properly stop before turning out of

suspicion t0 believe that his taillights were not properly

Davis entered a conditional guilty plea t0 possession of methamphetamine, reserving the
right t0 appeal the denial

of his motion t0 suppress, and the

charges. (R., pp.60, 71-72, 76.)

The

district court

state

dismissed the remaining

sentenced Davis t0 seven years With two years

ﬁxed, but suspended that sentence in favor 0f seven-year period of probation.

Davis timely appealed.

(Tr.,

pp.88-90.)

(TL, pp.76-83.)

ISSJ
Davis

states the issues

Did the

on appeal

district court err in

as:

denying Mr. Davis’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Davis

failed t0

show

that the district court erred

by denying

his

motion

t0 suppress?

ARGUMENT
Davis Fails To
A.

Show That The

District Court Erred

BV Denying His Motion To

Suppress

Introduction

DaVis’ motion to suppress was premised on the proposition that Ofﬁcer Stokes did not

have reasonable suspicion
t0 his arrest

entirely

t0 initiate the trafﬁc stop

and the recovery of narcotics.

on the

from which Davis

(R., pp.45-52.)

fact that a magistrate court acquitted

bases 0f the stop.

According

(Id.)

Stokes did not have reasonable suspicion.

On

(Id.)

ﬂed, which ﬂight led

His argument below relied almost

him of the

t0 Davis, that acquittal

later

trafﬁc Violations that were the

somehow

implied that the Ofﬁcer

appeal, though, he has

abandoned

that

argument.3 Instead, he argues only that Ofﬁcer Stokes’ testimony at the suppression hearing was
insufﬁcient to establish that he had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and investigate

Whether Davis committed a trafﬁc Violation.

(E Appellant’s brief, p.6 (“ML Davis asserts

contrary t0 the district court’s conclusions, the facts established

were inadequate

to provide a reasonable suspicion that

This argument

[trafﬁc] offenses.”)).

fails.

that,

by Ofﬁcer Stokes’ testimony

Mr. Davis had committed either of the

Based 0n Ofﬁcer Stokes” testimony, which was the

only evidence presented in association With the motion t0 suppress, the

district court correctly

concluded that Ofﬁcer Stokes had reasonable articulable suspicion both that Davis failed to

3

Davis

is

explicit that

he

is

not challenging the district court’s determination not t0 consider any

recording 0r transcript from the

trial

brief, p.2 n.1.) More
when arguing that the
any authority or make any

of the trafﬁc Violations. (Appellant’s

generally though, 0n appeal he does not discuss or mention the acquittal
district court erred in

denying the motion t0 suppress, nor does he

(E

any way relevant.
has therefore abandoned and waived that argument.

argument to suggest

that

it is

in

cite

generally Appellant’s brief, pp.5-10.)

He

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues 0n appeal are not supported by propositions 0f law,
authority, 0r argument, they will not be considered”).

properly stop

When he

exited the parking lot and that he

was operating a vehicle Without

functioning taillights.

Standard

B.

Of Review

The standard of review 0f a suppression motion
motion
are

is

biﬁlrcated.

When

t0 suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

a decision

on a

ﬁndings of fact that

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 0f constitutional

principles t0 those facts.

State V. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240,

1242 (2006).

Thus, “‘[d]eterminations 0f reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo,’ While ﬁndings of fact
that support a determination

Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 628,

0f reasonable suspicion are reviewed for clear error.”

434 P.3d 801, 803 (2019)

3

State V.

(alterations in original) (quoting State V.

Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111, 294 P.3d 1121, 1123 (2013)).

Ofﬁcer Stokes Had Reasonable Suspicion To

C.

“Because a routine trafﬁc stop

more analogous

t0

is

Initiate

The Trafﬁc Stop

normally limited in scope and 0f short duration,

an investigative detention than a custodial

under the principles

set forth in

Terry

v.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1,

arrest

and therefore

is

it is

analyzed

88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889

(1968).” State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). “Under the

Fourth Amendment, an ofﬁcer
there

is

may

stop a vehicle t0 investigate possible criminal behavior if

a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle

is

being driven contrary to trafﬁc

laws.” State V. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004). “Whether an ofﬁcer

possessed reasonable suspicion

is

evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances

the ofﬁcer at or before the time 0f the stop.”

1203,

1210 (2009).

“An

State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811,

known

t0

203 P.3d

investigatory stop does not deal with hard certainties, but with

probabilities.”

State V.

Munoz, 149 Idaho

121, 126, 233 P.3d 52, 57 (2010).

“Although a mere

‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires

is

considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously
less than is necessary for

(internal quotations

and

probable cause.”

Navarette

citations omitted).

Ofﬁcer Stokes had reasonable suspicion

(1)

by turning out 0f the

that

Davis violated the trafﬁc laws in two ways:

gas—station parking lot Without

to crossing the sidewalk, in Violation

Without operational

572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)

V. California,

of Idaho Code

taillights, in Violation

coming

t0 a full stop

§ 49-651,

and

(2)

immediately prior

by driving a vehicle

of Idaho Code §§ 49-906 and 49-903. As the

district

court found, though Ofﬁcer Stokes had reasonable suspicion that Davis violated the trafﬁc laws

in both

of these ways, either alone was sufﬁcient to justify the trafﬁc

stop.

(Tr., p.39,

L.4

— p.40,

L20.)

Ofﬁcer Stokes Had Reasonable Suspicion That Davis Violated LC.

1.

Idaho Code § 49-651 provides

The

S

49-651

that:

driver 0f a vehicle emerging

from an

alley, building, private

road 0r driveway

within a business or residential district shall stop the vehicle immediately prior to
driving onto a sidewalk 0r onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley,

no sidewalk area, shall stop
be entered where the driver has a View of

building entrance, 0r driveway, 0r in the event there
at the

point nearest the highway t0

is

approaching trafﬁc.

Ofﬁcer Stokes testiﬁed

that

he observed Davis’ vehicle exit the gas station onto Vista Avenue

Without coming t0 a stop before doing

prompted him

to follow Davis.

so,

which he believed

(TL, p.9, L.15

—

t0

p.10, L.16.)

be a trafﬁc Violation and which

On

appeal, Davis argues that

observation did not provide reasonable suspicion to believe he violated Idaho

Code

because, 0n cross—examination, Ofﬁcer Stokes acknowledged that there were gas

§

49-651

pumps

that

brieﬂy obstructed his View and the vehicle could have stopped While his View was obstructed.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7 (citing Tr., p.14, Ls.5-23; p.20, Ls.3-13).)

But 0n redirect examination Ofﬁcer Stokes clariﬁed

that

he was able to see the entire

sidewalk and entry to the gas station and, With that View and What he saw, Davis could not have
stopped “immediately prior” to crossing the sidewalk 0r sidewalk area as required by Idaho Code
§ 49-651.

(Tr., p.20,

L.25 — p.21, L.20.) While he acknowledged that Davis could possibly have

stopped several feet before reaching the sidewalk

had reasonable suspicion

that

When

his

Davis violated Idaho Code

View was blocked, he nevertheless

§ 49-651.

That

so both because

is

stopping several feet before the sidewalk, as opposed t0 immediately before driving onto

would not

constitute compliance With that statute,

and because, even

if

it

164 Idaho 626, 629, 434 P.3d 801, 804 (2019).

entitled t0 initiate a trafﬁc stop t0 further investigate

At a minimum, Ofﬁcer Stokes was

Whether Davis complied With the

ﬂ

Idaho Code § 49-906 requires that “[e]very motor vehicle
least

one

statute.

Ofﬁcer Stokes Had Reasonable Suspicion Davis Violated LC. SS 49-906

2.

(1) tail

plainly Visible

lamp mounted on the

rear,

Which when lighted

from a distance 0f ﬁve hundred (500)

m

did, reasonable

suspicion 0f criminal conduct does not require eliminating every possibility of error.

m,

it,

.

.

shall

.

And

49-

be equipped with

at

as required, shall emit a red light

feet t0 the rear.

.

.

.

Any

tail

lamp

shall

be

wired so to be lighted whenever the head lamps 0r auxiliary driving lamps are lighted.” Idaho

Code

§

49-903 requires a vehicles

lights t0

be operational between sunset and

Stokes observed DaVis’ vehicle at 2:30 in the morning.

should have been operational.

Ofﬁcer Stokes testiﬁed

observed that neither of Davis”

taillights

(TL, p.16, Ls.22-25.)

that

when he began

sunrise.

Ofﬁcer

Davis’ taillights

following Davis he

appeared t0 be operational and he conﬁrmed that they

were not by brieﬂy turning off his headlights

Having done

p.11, L.10.)

were not on.

taillights

On

so,

glare.

(TL, p.10, L.18

—

he testiﬁed that he was “a hundred percent sure” that DaVis’

(T12, p.18,

L.14 — p.19, L5.)

Ofﬁcer Stokes’ testimony

appeal, Davis argues that

were not operating when he ﬁrst

Ofﬁcer Stokes testiﬁed

much by brieﬂy

that

that

he could see the

taillights

Davis somehow “conﬂict[s]” with his

started following

testimony that he then conﬁrmed as

brief, p.9.)

any reﬂective

to eliminate

turning off his headlights.

he believed DaVis’

taillights

(Appellant’s

were not operating and,

to

ensure he was correct, turned off his headlights so that the taillights would be more Visible if he

was mistaken and they were
“conﬂict” between

initially

and then conﬁrming
also suggests that

lit.

(TL, p.10, L.17

observing that the

that observation

p.11, L.10; p.16, Ls.12-21.)

taillights

by eliminating a

Ofﬁcer Stokes’ testimony

that

not credible in light of his testimony that “Vista

8),

—

a fact defense counsel suggested would

possibility of error,

Avenue was
it

taillights

‘Well

lit’

0n the

question constituted a suggestion that

were not operating was

that night (TL, p.17, Ls.1-

difﬁcult to determine Whether taillights were

taillights,

Avenue was well
it

(TL, p.17, Ls.1-8.)

The

district court credited

“it is for

Snider

V.

made

Even

this

if that

difﬁcult for Ofﬁcer Stokes to see the

suggestions from defense counsel are not evidence.

judge the credibility of witnesses.”
(2012).

lit.

would have been

concerns about Ofﬁcer Stokes’ credibility,

n0

Davis

other.

illuminated (TL, p.17, Ls.1-8).” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Apparently, defense counsel

suggestion by simply asking if Vista

is

were not functioning, on the one hand,

he was sure the

make

There

Finally,

the district court t0

even

if there

were

weigh the evidence and

Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 645, 289 P.3d 43, 47

Ofﬁcer Stokes” testimony.

(T12, p.40, Ls.1-20.)

The

district

court

correctly

determined that Ofﬁcer Stokes testimony established

reasonable suspicion for the trafﬁc stop.

Davis has not shown that the

district court erred in

denying his motion t0 suppress.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

DATED this 2nd day of March, 2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of March, 2020, served a true and correct
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means 0f iCourt

copy of the foregoing
File and Serve:

KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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